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Beyond Presumptions and Peafowl:
Reconciling the Legal Principle of Equality
with the Pedagogical Benefits of Gender
Differentiation
MICHAEL

J. KAUFMANt

INTRODUCTION

Darwin's theory of natural selection and Aristotle's
theory of equality have critical corollaries. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has disregarded both of them in its
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
Darwin's theory of natural selection describes the
punitive effect of environmental pressures on individual
members of a species that do not possess the traits most
conducive to survival within that species. 1 The theory of
sexual selection, which generally describes how the female
member of the species chooses a male mate, is a corollary of

t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and Director of the
ChildLaw and Education Institute, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
I wish to thank Professor Alan Raphael for his remarkable insights into the
issues addressed in this article, and Gretchen Harris and Jennifer Ostrander
for their invaluable research and editorial assistance.
1. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859)
[hereinafter ORIGIN OF SPECIES]; CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND
SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX (1871) [hereinafter DESCENT OF MAN].
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natural selection.2 Darwin devised his theory of sexual
selection in an effort to explain gender differences, using3
the peafowl as a classic example of this phenomenon.
Female peafowl are attracted by, and mate with, male
peafowl that have the largest and most colorful tails, traits
which are not conducive to peafowl survival against
environmental pressures. In fact, colorful plumage tends to
attract predators, and large tails decrease the male
peafowl's ability to fly to escape predators. Nevertheless,
the female peafowl selects the visually attractive male,
thereby ensuring that its genes will be more likely to
survive in subsequent generations. The peafowl led Darwin
to conclude that gender differences are 4the natural result of
the process of differential reproduction.
Although biologists have traveled light-years from
Darwin's observations of the peafowl, they recently have
reaffirmed the undeniable natural differences between
males and females. Geneticists have discovered that the
human X-chromosome has developed "a unique biology that
was shaped by its evolution as the sex chromosome shared
by males and females." 5 Indeed, there is dramatic new

2. Sexual selection is defined as differential reproduction owing to variation
in

the ability to attract

mates. See DOUGLAS J.

FITUYMA,

EVOLUTIONARY

BIOLOGY 586-94 (3d ed. 1998). The appearance and behaviors of organisms are
adapted for both survival and reproductive attractiveness. See MARLENE ZUK,
SEXUAL SELECTIONS: WHAT WE CAN AND CAN'T LEARN ABOUT SEX FROM ANIMALS

6-7. Darwin posited that color variation was an important aspect of attracting
mates. Id. With regard to reproductive attractiveness, Darwin showed that
females exercise more choice than males in their selection of mates because
their limited ability to propagate gives them a greater investment in the
reproductive process. See id. at 8-10, 55. Males, by contrast, are not so limited in
the number of offspring they can produce. See id. But because females are
limited in the number of offspring they can produce, they are inclined to be
selective in choosing a mate who will continue the strongest traits of the
species. See JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION'S RAINBOW 125 (2004). Females
select "attractive" males because their male offspring are likely to have the
same attractive traits necessary to attract females of subsequent generations
and because males display the quality of their genes through their
attractiveness. DESCENT OF MAN, supra note 1, at 258-59.
3. See DESCENT OF MAN, supra note 1, at 120; MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:
SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 342-43 (1994).

4. See generally DESCENT OF MAN, supra note 1; RIDLEY, supra note 3.
5. Mark T. Ross et al., The DNA Sequence of the Human X Chromosome, 434
NATURE 325, 325 (2005).
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evidence of significant differences in the genetic
composition of men and women. 6 The significant gender
differences in brain development have already been proven,
and those differences largely7 contribute to gender
differences in learning strategies.
Aristotle's maxim of equality, positing that like cases
should be treated in a like manner, 8 also has a necessary
corollary often ignored by the United States Supreme
Court: unlike cases should be treated in an unlike manner.
If, as we are now learning, male cognition is unlike female
cognition, then those unlike cases should not be treated the
same in the eyes of the law. Yet, in interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment, 9 the Supreme Court has
disregarded critical corollaries to both Aristotle's equality
principle and Darwin's evolutionary principle. In so doing,
the Court has failed to examine whether there are provable
gender differences in persons that would legitimate
differences in their legal treatment. Instead of seriously
considering the biological and developmental differences
among the sexes, the Court has presumed that all persons
are alike regardless of gender, especially with respect to
education.
That unexamined premise forces another presumption:
any governmental action that treats persons differently
based on gender is presumed to violate the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause. The latter presumption of
unconstitutionality, however, finds no support in the
principle of equality itself. If there are in fact relevant and
significant biological differences in gender, then the legal
presumption in favor of treating persons alike regardless of

6. See Laura Carrel & Huntington F. Willard, X-inactivation Profile Reveals
Extensive Variability in X-linked Gene Expression in Females, 434 NATURE 400
(2005).
7. See DOREEN KIMURA, SEX AND COGNITION (1999); ANNE MOIR & DAVID
JESSEL, BRAIN SEX: THE REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN (1991)

(behavioral differences in boys and girls reflect a basic difference in the brain);
RIDLEY, supra note 3 (gender differences far exceed racial differences); see also
discussion infra Part II.B.2.
8. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. E, 1131a (H.G. Apostle trans.,
.1984).

9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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gender is a presumption in favor of laws that treat unlike
cases in a like manner.
The presumption of unconstitutionality, which is often
rationalized by the rhetoric of equality, is actually based on
a normative standard that governmental programs should
not injure people because of their gender. That standard
may appear laudable, but it is not based on equality. In
fact, that normative standard and its attendant
the
allow
the
Court to
presume
presumptions
constitutionality of governmental programs that actually
injure women because such programs disregard the proven
inherent conditions that make women different from men.
In short, our courts presume that all peafowl are created
equal, and any law treating them differently violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Yet, not all peafowl are equal.
Presuming that they are equal is an affront to those
persons the law tries to protect and to the principles and
goals of equality.
This Article will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is in need of
significant evolution. Part I demonstrates that in its
significant equal protection decisions the Court has
explicitly or implicitly presumed that American students
are equal in their educational opportunities and learning
strategies. By presuming students are equal in status and
condition, the Court burdens the government with
justifying any differential treatment of students based on
their gender, reasoning that heightened scrutiny of genderbased education programs guarantees "equal protection" to
the affected students. This presumption has helped the
programs
that
to
invalidate
government
Court
disadvantage students because of their gender. 10
Yet, this Article demonstrates the fundamental fallacy
of the Court's presumption of equality. The maxim of
equality, that "like" cases must be treated alike, but
"unlike" cases must be treated differently, underlies the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court
construes the Equal Protection Clause as "essentially a

10. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (presuming the
unconstitutionality of Virginia's exclusion of women from its unique military
academy).
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direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike."" However, the Court erroneously presumes
that gender-based educational programs automatically
violate the Equal Protection Clause, ignoring the corollary
to the maxim of equality. The presumption that all students
are equal is valid only if they are in fact alike regardless of
gender. But the Court rarely questions whether male and
female students are in fact alike as a descriptive matter.
Because the Court fails to examine students' different
educational conditions, it presumes that all students are
alike regardless of gender and therefore should be treated
alike by educational programs. Mounting research suggests,
however, that male and female students learn and develop
differently; by continuing to treat all students the same, the
Court violates the fundamental nature of equality and of
equal protection.
Part II explains how the Court's failure to consider the
significant gender differences in the educational condition
of American students is harmful for at least two reasons,
one rhetorical, the other substantive. First, the Court
appeals to the rhetoric of equality, but simultaneously
undermines the concept by making a disingenuous effort to
understand the most relevant measures of equality. Second,
by failing to consider the actual learning strategies of
women, the Court disregards the existence of significant
gender differences in these strategies, contrary to virtually
all credible evidence.
The remainder of this Article explores the consequences
of a proposed new Equal Protection Clause analysis that
recognizes the natural differences between male and female
students. In lieu of the three-tier analysis, 12 which is based
on unfounded judicial presumptions of equality, this article

11. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
12. See id. Specifically, according to the rational basis, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny tests, respectively: (1) whether the challenged law
serves a legitimate, important, or compelling governmental interest; (2)
whether the challenged law is rationally related to a legitimate interest,
whether the government has an exceedingly persuasive justification for the
challenged law, or whether the challenged law is narrowly tailored to achieve
the compelling governmental interest. Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and
the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory,
Practice& Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 188-90 (2003).
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recommends that courts examine two issues in every case:
(1) the challenged law, and (2) the persons challenged by
the law.
First, courts would articulate the differential treatment
that the law mandates and determine whether that
treatment is legitimate, much like the first prong of the
traditional analysis. But then courts would determine
whether actual differences exist in fact between those who
are and are not affected by the law. It would require lower
courts to make, and appellate courts to review, an
evidentiary determination about whether those persons
affected differently by the law are in fact different in their
natural or social condition. If the party challenging the law
can show either that the law's interests are not legitimate,
or that the law treats persons alike when they are in fact
different (or different when they are in fact alike), then the
law is unconstitutional. Under this model, the law would
treat like cases alike and unlike cases differently, true to
the equality principle.
In light of the actual gender differences among
students, the equality maxim requires the Court to
presume the unconstitutionality of gender-based educational programs that treat students "alike" regardless of
those differences. Programs that treat students alike
regardless of their gender treat "unlike" students in a "like"
manner. The presumption against such programs should be
just as strong as the existing presumption against
programs that treat "like" cases in an "unlike" name.
Accordingly, this article suggests that there should be
no judicial presumption against government programs that
treat male and female students differently because of their
different learning strategies. The government also should
not bear the burden of justifying such gender differences.
To the contrary, recognizing that significant gender
differences exist in education, the government should have
the burden of justifying any educational programs that fail
to acknowledge those differences. The equality maxim
demands no less.
Gender-based educational programs also are consistent
with best educational practices. The educational strategy
termed "differentiation" requires educators to tailor their
instructional practices to meet the different learning
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strategies that exist among a group of students. 13 The
evidence demonstrates that differentiation of instruction
based on learning strategies generally is effective;
differentiation of instruction based on male and female
learning strategies is successful as well. 14 Accordingly, a
governmental program that encourages differentiation of
instructional practices for male and female students would
treat unlike learners in an appropriately unlike manner.
Furthermore, educating female students in a separate
environment from male students might treat unlike
learners in an appropriately unlike manner, but only so far
as the different treatment is tailored to the actual
differences in learning opportunities or strategies.
I. THE COURT'S PRESUMPTION OF EQUALITY IS UNFOUNDED

A. The Court's Equal Protection Clause Presumptions
The Supreme Court's three-tiered Equal Protection
Clause analysis 15 evolved from the Court's suspicion that
legislation classifying persons based on race was designed
to disadvantage members of a racial minority. 16 Under that
analysis, a governmental educational program that affects a
"suspect class," like an underrepresented racial minority,
will be strictly scrutinized to determine whether it violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The source for such
heightened scrutiny is often traced to Footnote Four in
13. See, e.g., CAROL ANN TOMLINSON & SuSAN DEMIRSKY ALLAN, LEADERSHIP
FOR DIFFERENTIATING SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS (2000).
14. See id.; see also M. GURIAN, BOYS AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY! (2001).

15. See Deutsch, supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also
Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action & the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Fragmentation of Theory after Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. and Metro
Broadcasting,Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 317, 339 (1992).
17. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 561
(1982) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980)); see also Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) ("[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry [are]
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality." (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
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United States v. CaroleneProducts.18 Yet, that footnote was
designed at most to suggest exceptions to the presumption
of constitutionality usually given to legislation. 19 The
Carolene Products Court cautioned that the presumption of
constitutionality may be "narrower" where the challenged
legislation is within a "specific prohibition of the
Constitution," or where the law "restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
the repeal of undesirable legislation [or is] directed at
particular religious [minorities], . . . national [minorities] ' .20 .
racial minorities ... [or] discrete and insular minorities.
While the Court questioned whether "exacting judicial
scrutiny" might be appropriate in these circumstances, it
never suggested overturning the usual presumption that
legislation is constitutionally valid. The Court did not
remotely argue that the legislation be presumed
unconstitutional in these situations. Nevertheless, under
the "strict scrutiny" standard developed since Carolene
Products, any state regulation that classifies people based
on their race is presumed to violate the Equal Protection
Clause; that presumption is unassailable unless the state
can show that the challenged law is finely tailored to
achieve a compelling or substantial state interest. 2 1 For
instance, in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed that
any governmental program that classifies persons based on
race is presumed to violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even if it is designed to assist a "suspect class. '22
Not only did the Court misconstrue Carolene Products
to create a presumption against the constitutionality of
18. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 290 n.28 (1978).
19. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152, n.4; see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (expanding upon the footnote's suggestions to

create a theory of judicial review based upon the Court's role in protecting the
democratic political process).
20. CaroleneProducts,304 U.S. at 153.
21. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). See generally Angelo N. Ancheta,
Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 21 (2004).
22. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
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racial classifications, it then compounded its error by
extending
that
presumption
to
legislation
that
differentiates based on gender. Under the "intermediate"
standard of scrutiny, all state educational programs
distinguishing people based on gender also are presumed to
be "unequal"; that presumption of unconstitutionality is
unrebuttable unless the state can provide an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for its law. 23 In Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court made
clear that any governmental classification based on gender
is subject to heightened scrutiny, even if the classification
unquestionably advantages women. 24 Although the Court
suggested that the test for determining the validity of
gender-based classifications must be devoid of stereotypical
notions of the characteristics of men and women, its
declaration was stronger: the presumption of unconstitutionality must be "applied free of fixed notions
concerning
'25
the roles and abilities of males and females.
In its caution to eliminate stereotyping from the
constitutional analysis, the Hogan Court also eliminates
any serious consideration of the actual different "abilities"
of males and females. 26 Even the dissenters in Hogan
accepted the presumption that all gender-based classifications in educational institutions violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 27 They quarreled instead with the degree
of persuasiveness required to justify the challenged gender
classification. Thus, Justice Powell agreed with the
majority that male students were like female students, but
argued that the benefits of single-sex institutions justified
Mississippi's different treatment of male and female
students. 28 Neither the majority nor the dissenters explored
the very different question of whether male and female
students could be proven to be sufficiently different in their

23. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); see
also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
24. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718, 728; see also Coban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.

380, 394 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 403 U.S. 71,
75 (1971).
25. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
26. Id. at 725.
27. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (Powell, J. dissenting).
28. See id. at 735.
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learning so as to make a presumption in favor of their
different treatment appropriate.
Absent gender- or race-based distinctions, the Court
presumes that legislation is constitutional in that it treats
like cases in a like manner and unlike cases in an unlike
manner. 29 The Court recognizes "[t]he general rule that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest." 30 Yet, in Plyer v. Doe,31 City
34
of Cleburne,32 Romer v. Evans,33 and Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court invalidated legislation based upon this so-called
"rational basis" test. Ironically, in these cases, the Court
showed a willingness to determine whether there were
differences among the conditions of the persons classified by
each of those challenged laws that would warrant their
different treatment or render unconstitutional their similar
treatment.
B. The Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause
PresumptionsAre Not Supported by the Equality Maxim
As Aristotle fully understood, his maxim that like cases
should be treated in a like manner, 35 and that unlike cases
should be treated in an unlike manner 36 requires both a
descriptive analysis of the "likeness" of citizens and a
29. All other state regulations will be upheld under the most lenient
scrutiny, so long as the regulation is rationally related to furthering a
legitimate state interest. See Westen, supra note 17, at 569.
30. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
31. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional a Texas law that denied
children of illegal aliens the benefits of a public education).
32. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (overturning a local zoning decision that denied a
construction permit for a home for the mentally disabled).
33. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional amendment
that would have precluded homosexuals from lobbying for legislation that
extended civil rights law protections to them).
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas' criminalization of consensual
homosexual sodomy).
35. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 8; see also Westen, supra note 17, at 543
(citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 111.9 1280a, bk. Il1.12 1282b-3a, bk. V.1 1301a-b
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 1921)).
36. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 35, at bk. 111.9. 1280a, book 111.12.
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normative analysis of the propriety of their treatment by
the law. 37 Even if a regime presumes that all persons are
entitled by their nature to equal protection of the laws,
important judgments about which cases are in fact alike
and which cases should be treated alike cannot be resolved
without standards independent of equality.
Once these judgments are made, however, the equality
maxim appears to call into question laws that treat like
cases in an unlike manner. Presuming the constitutionality
of laws that treat like cases in a like manner seems to be
consistent with the equality maxim. Yet, the equality
maxim also appears to question laws that treat unlike cases
in a like manner. The maxim should lead to a presumption
against the constitutionality of those laws. Laws that treat
like cases in a like manner and unlike cases in an unlike
manner should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality
under the equality principle.
In a seminal series of publications, Professor Peter
Westen shows that Aristotle's principle of equality is
circular, 38 and cannot be employed to resolve any
jurisprudential question without reference to "substantive"
39
values or rights wholly apart from equality itself.
Professor Westen dissects each part of the Aristotelian
equality principle. First, the formula requires a determination of whether two or more persons are, or should be
deemed, alike for the purpose of applying the equality
principle. 40 Because no two persons are truly alike, that
determination depends on a judgment about the relevance
37. Aristotle recognized that each regime would have to reach the political
judgment about whether its citizens were "like" or "unalike." See ARISTOTLE,
supra note 8, at 1131a. He understood that linking justice with equality begged
the political question of the relevance of similarities and differences: "All men
agree that what is just in distribution should be according to merit of some sort,
Id.
but not all men agree as to what that merit should be ....
38. Westen acknowledges that this insight into the circular nature of
"equality" is not new. Westen, supra note 17, at 574-78. Indeed, he posits that
Aristotle's equality maxim has had staying power partly because it expresses an
unassailable tautology. Id.
39. Id. at 561; see also PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF EQUALITY IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990)
[hereinafter SPEAKING OF EQUALITY]; Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in
Law, Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983)
[hereinafter Westen, Reply].

40. Westen, supra note 17, at 543.
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of the undeniable differences between people. People are
are judged irrelevant by some
alike only if their differences
41
standard.
external
Second, Westen shows that "treatments can be alike
only in reference to some moral rule."42 The same moral
rule or independent legal standard that determines the
relevance of people's similarities and dissimilarities also
determines whether people should or should not be treated
alike under the law. A law cannot be judged, therefore, by
the extent to which it treats people equally. Westen
concludes that the constitutional concept of equal protection
under the law is "an empty vessel with no substantive
moral content of its own." 43 Accordingly, an idea of justice
based solely on the principle of equality is meaningless
without a "substantive moral' 44 or legal standard that
determine[s] what is one's 'due.'
Shortly after Westen authored his seminal work, a host
of scholars feverishly attempted to inject some independent
meaning into the idea of equality. 45 Westen, however,
effectively discarded these arguments. 46 More recently,
Professors Christopher Peters and Kent Greenwalt have
tried to resurrect the principle of equality.
Professor Peters argues that the principle of
"prescriptive equality" is not meaningless. Under this
41. Id. at 544.
42. Id. at 547.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 557. Any principle of justice based on this empty idea of equality is
vacuous as well. The foundation of justice is "giving every person his due." Id. at
556. The equality principle's declaration that persons who are alike should be
treated alike indicates that treating people equally means giving them their
"due." To argue that justice requires that persons who are alike should be
treated alike, therefore, has no genuine meaning unless the argument contains
some moral basis for determining whether they are alike in such a way as to
make morally proper their similar treatment. Id. at 557.
45. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to
Professor Westen, 81 MICH L. REV. 575 (1983); William Cohen, Is Equal
Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a Surrogate for Other Rights, 59 TUL. L.
REV. 884 (1985); Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 600 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Westen, Reply, supra note 39.
46. See generally Westen, Reply, supra note 39.
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principle, the "bare fact that a person has been treated in a
certain way is a reason in itself for treating another
identically situated person in the same way."47 Once it is
determined that two persons are identically situated, Peters
contends, the equality principle has meaning because it
requires their identical treatment. Peters concedes,
however, that if this prescriptive principle does have any
meaning, that meaning is misguided because it may lead to
48
treating equals equally, even if that treatment is unjust.
For example, Professor Peters imagines a situation in
which eleven drowning people compete for only ten
available spots on a lifeboat. 49 Because prescriptive equality
demands that all of them be treated equally, none of them
may receive spots in the lifeboat and all of them equally
may drown.5 0 Accordingly, Peters concludes that the
irrelevant or harmful when
principle of equality is either 51
scarcity.
of
conditions
are
there
Professor Greenwalt agrees with Peters that the
52
principle of equality does not always lead to "right action."
Still, Greenwalt contends that the equality principle has
presumptive force because it "might pull some people to
treat equals equally, although other considerations would
suggest a different outcome." 53 For example, the principle of
equality creates a presumption favoring equal distributions
may be rebutted by
of lifeboat spots, but that presumption
54
stronger values, like saving lives.
These scholars' efforts to resurrect the equality
principle ultimately are unavailing. First, as Westen
established in anticipating these efforts, any judicial
allegiance to a deeply rooted presumption favoring equal
treatment is ultimately indeterminate and obfuscates
47. Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1223
(1997).
48. See id. at 1229.
49. See Peters, supra note 47, at 1238.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality" Two Steps Forward, 110
HARv.L. REV. 1265, 1277 (1997).
53. Id. at 1277.
54. See id. at 1273, 1277.
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judgments independent of equality. 55 The equality principle
cannot support a presumption opposing laws that treat
persons differently because all laws treat some people
differently from others for some purposes. Second, and more
importantly, the Court's presumption favoring equal
treatment for all is inconsistent with the maxim of equality
itself. Once again, the equality principle requires not only
that like cases be treated in a like manner, but also that
unlike cases be treated in an unlike manner.
Absent from the debate about the meaning of equality
is any serious discussion of whether cases are in fact alike.
Greenwalt, Peters and even Westen focus their attention on
the presumption favoring the like treatment of like cases.
They assume that the cases at issue are alike, and question
whether the law treats them in a like manner. Hence,
Peters' arguments about the possible injustice of treating
like cases in a like manner (i.e., all drowning persons are
treated the same, but they all die), do not question the basis
for determining whether the cases are in fact "alike."
Greenwalt also argues that deeply rooted feelings favor like
treatment, but only after it is determined that the cases at
issue are in fact alike. Yet, the equality maxim contains
absolutely no presumption favoring like treatment. To the
contrary, that maxim demands unlike treatment where it is
determined that the persons affected by the treatment are
in fact not alike.
As Westen shows, the question of whether individuals
are "alike" cannot be answered by the principle of equality,
but depends on standards anterior to equality. Because no
two persons are alike, the judicial system must create a
mechanism for determining the significance of differences
among individuals. The mechanism must have a descriptive
and a normative component. The descriptive component
provides a legitimate method of assessing actual, real-world
conditions of relevant difference. The normative component
provides a legitimate method of assessing which differences
should be recognized as morally significant. The moral or
normative proposition that all men are created equal, for
instance, may help to explain the presumption that all
individuals are like cases and thus should receive like

55. See Westen, supra note 17, at 574-76, 579.
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treatment. Yet, that normative proposition is not a
descriptive one. In fact, the premise that all men are
created equal says nothing about whether individuals are in
fact "alike" for any particular purpose. The premise that all
individuals should be treated equally regardless of race or
gender permeates the Supreme Court's Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence. That premise, however, obfuscates
the fact that individuals are not in fact alike, and creates
the unfounded presumption favoring laws that treat unlike
cases as if they were alike.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S PRESUMPTION OF GENDER
EQUALITY IN LEARNING STRATEGIES IS UNFOUNDED

Westen's most important contribution to serious
thought about equality may well be his critique of the
abuses of the "equality" principle in legal and political
discourse surrounding the constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. 56 Once it is conceded that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require all persons to be treated alike, that
clause, like the equality principle itself, cannot be
interpreted without relying upon a legal or moral standard
anterior to equality. Even scholars who doubt Westen's
premise that equality is meaningless cannot deny his
assertion that many judicial interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause rely on the empty rhetoric of equality to
support
otherwise
unexamined
and
unsupportable
presumptions.5 7 This insight is particularly helpful in
understanding the Supreme Court's recent equal protection
decisions regarding gender-conscious educational programs.

A. The Court's Traditionof Masking Differences in
Educational Opportunities
The Court has a history of slighting differences between
people that warrant differential treatment under the law,
beginning with its apparent remediation of the racially
56. The Equal Protection Clause in the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
57. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 902 (arguing that judges use equality
as a rationale for deciding cases which are really based on other substantive
values in order to "avoid larger issues"),
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discriminatory educational policies in Brown v. Board of
Education58 to the apparent assistance for racial minorities
in Grutter59 and Gratz.60 The Court's misuse of the equality
principle in racial discrimination cases has become the
precedent for its misuse
of the equality principle in gender
61
discrimination cases.
Brown cannot be justified by the equality principle
alone. The Court declared that racially segregated
educational facilities are "inherently unequal"; 62 however,
as Westen shows, there is no such thing as "inherent"
inequality. 63 The actual reasoning of Brown is that state
laws which impose racial segregation in public education
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they injure
African-American school children. 64 Under this logic, even if
such laws were to provide equal educational resources, they
would nevertheless be unconstitutional because they would
have a "detrimental effect" on African-American students
by perpetuating stereotypes harmful to African-American
students: (1) they reinforce a stigma of inferiority; (2) they
generate a feeling of lesser status; (3) they retard the
mental and educational development of African-American
students; and (4) they deny to African-American students
the educational benefits of attending a racially-integrated
school.65
On a fundamental level, Brown assumed that AfricanAmerican children were "like" white children in their right
to be free from the "injury" of segregated schools or from
66
being denied the opportunity to attend a diverse school.
But Brown can be understood only by looking to these
important substantive values apart from equality. The
notion that African-American students should be treated
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
60. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
61, See infra Section III.B.
62, Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
63. See generally Westen, supra note 17.
64. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
65. Id.
66. See id.
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just like white students is used to legitimize the reality that
their educational opportunities are not at all alike.
The empty rhetoric of equality also is evident in the
Court's decisions regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious school admissions policies, presumably intended
to assist racial minorities. Justice Powell's "touchstone"
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
begins with the assertion that "equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and
67
something else when applied to a person of another color."
Yet, as Westen shows, equal protection always means one
thing when applied to one individual, and something else
when applied to another individual, if those two individuals
are adjudged to be different in a relevant respect. 68 Indeed,
Justice Powell himself indicates that "the attainment of a
diverse student body" is a compelling interest that69justifies
the treatment of one race differently from another.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice Powell's view in
2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, cases
involving the admissions policies at the University of
Michigan and its law school. 70 The Court recognized that
when it strictly scrutinizes all governmental "uses of race,"
it does so in order to take "relevant" differences between the
races into account.7 1 The Court acknowledges that
"[c]ontext matters" and not every "decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable. ' 72 In other words, AfricanAmerican applicants to college and graduate school may not
be "like" white applicants to college and graduate school
because African-American students may bring an element
of diversity to the educational institution different from
that brought by a white student.
Yet, because all governmental programs treat some
people differently from others, the question again reduces to
whether the Supreme Court is willing to legitimize the
distinction made between applicants. In Grutter, the Court
67. 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
68. See discussion supra Part I.B; see Westen, supra note 17.
69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-315.
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-272.
71. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.

72. Id.
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recognizes that the State of Michigan has valuable reasons
for treating applicants of one race differently from those of
another, reasons which survive strict scrutiny. The
Supreme Court, however, has found only two political
values to be so compelling as to justify governmental
policies which treat persons differently because of their
race: (1) remedying past discrimination against members of
a racial minority; and (2) attaining a diverse student body.
Reduced to the equality principle, the Court indicates that
African-American students are like white students in every
other circumstance except victimization by specific, proven,
past acts of racial injury and the capacity to bring diversity.
Yet, the Court presumes that white students are otherwise
like non-white students in their educational opportunities.
Suppose the Court did acknowledge that the
educational opportunities available to African-American
students are different from those available to white
students because of their different history of injury from a
legally-enforced "racial caste system" in education, their
different condition of injury from "conscious and
unconscious race bias," their different condition of injury
from educational segregation, and their different condition
of injury from inadequate educational resources. In her
dissent in Gratz, Justice Ginsburg recognizes that, "[o]ur
jurisprudence ranks race as a 'suspect' category, 'not
because [race] is inevitably an impermissible classification,
but because it is one which usually, to our national shame,
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial
inequality. ' 73 Put another way, racial classifications should
not be presumed to be "impermissible" where they are
designed to eradicate rather than to maintain the actual
condition of racial inequality. Governmental programs that
treat races differently are not invalid under the
Constitution if there is a legitimate determination that the
races are in fact different. For Justice Ginsburg, the
starting point for a serious Equal Protection Clause
analysis is whether the individuals who are affected by a
governmental program are in fact different.

73. 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (citing Norwalk Core v.
Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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B. The Court's Presumption of Equality Masks Gender
Differences in Learning Strategies
1. The Court Presumes That All Students Are Alike In
Their Learning Strategies, Regardless Of Gender. The
principle of equality also masks the substantive values
supporting the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions
affecting gender in educational institutions. In United
States v. Virginia,74 the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause precluded the State of Virginia from
reserving exclusively to men the unique educational
opportunities offered by its all-male Virginia Military
Institute. The Court offered its prescription for resolving
the constitutionality of any state "classification" based on
gender: "[fjocusing on the differential treatment or denial of
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court
must determine whether the proffered justification is
'exceedingly persuasive.' The burden of justification is
75
demanding and it rests entirely on the State."
Once again, the Court appears to establish a
presumption of equality: women should be treated the same
as men, unless the reasons for the "differential" treatment
the
Nevertheless,
justified.
persuasively
be
can
rhetorical
another
only
is
here
equality
of
presumption
device. Virginia's maintenance of a single-sex military
academy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because it treats like cases in an unlike manner.
Indeed, the Court declares that men and women are
different in significant ways: the physical differences are
"enduring"; men and women are not "fungible"; a
community of one sex is "different" from a community of
the differences
both sexes. 76 The court even describes
77
between men and women as "inherent."
If, as the Court concludes, men and women are
fundamentally different, any consistent principle or
presumption of equality might have led the Court to
74. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
75. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33.
76. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187, 193 (1946)).
77. Id.
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demand a justification for any law that does not treat them
differently. Yet, the Court also recognized that women may
be justly treated unlike men for some purposes, but not for
others. Hence, "[s]ex classifications" (i.e., treating women
unlike men) are good (morally proper forms of
discrimination) if they are designed to compensate women
for economic disabilities,
to promote
employment
opportunities or to "advance the full development of the
talent and capacities of our Nation's people." 78 On the other
hand, the Court declares that legislation that treats men
differently from women is unjust if it is designed "to create
or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
79
women."
To some extent, the Court acknowledges Westen's
point: women and men are alike in some significant ways
and not alike in significant ways; women may be justly
treated the same as men in some ways and may be justly
treated differently from men in other ways. The Court
seemed to recognize that the Virginia statute could not be
declared unconstitutional simply because it treated some
men differently from some women. Instead, the statute was
unconstitutional because it injured women by denying to
them a substantive right which was wholly separate from
equality: the right to an educational opportunity.8 0 If there
is a principle that emerges from this case, it is not the
equality principle. Rather, it is the recognition of the injury
to women caused by denying them a unique educational
opportunity.
Similarly, the equality principle alone cannot resolve
the question of the legitimacy or constitutionality of
instructional practices which treat female students
differently from male students in the classroom. The
78. Id.
79. Id. at 534.
80. It is not clear whether the right being denied is the right to an
educational opportunity, or the right to a unique educational opportunity. In a
footnote, the Virginia Court observed: "We do not question the Commonwealth's
prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities. We
address specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized by the
District Court and the Court of Appeals as 'unique,'... an opportunity available
only at Virginia's premier military institute, the Commonwealth's sole singlesex public university or college." Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7.
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rhetoric of equality seems to render suspicious any
differences between the education of men and women.
Suppose, however, that there are significant differences in
the way in which males and females learn. If female
learners are adjudged to be unlike male learners in
significant respects, then treating them in a like manner in
an educational institution would appear to disserve the
equality principle. If it is determined that men and women
are different learners, then there should be a presumption
against treating them the same way in the classroom. The
equality principle begs the question of whether male
learners are like female learners in such a way to make
unjust any program that treats them as if they were not
alike.
2. The Presumption That Female Students Are Like
Male Students In Their Learning Strategies Is Unfounded.
The question of whether men and women are different
learners can be answered by descriptive evidence. In fact,
all of the available credible brain research indicates that
female students are fundamentally8 different from male
students in their learning strategies. '
a) Gender Differences in Brain Development. While the
general construction of the human brain8 2 is essentially the
81. See, e.g.,

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); GURIAN, supra note 14.

82. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 18-33:
Every human brain has one hundred billion neurons (as many cells as
there are stars in the Milky Way), and one hundred trillion glial, or
connecting, cells. An adult human brain is eight pounds of dense
matter in three major layers: the cerebrae cortex at the top; the limbic
system in the middle; and the brain stem at the bottom, connecting
with the spinal cord ....
In general, the three layers of the brain are known for distinct
functions (though all functioning areas of the brain constantly
interact). The brain stem is where fight-or-flight responses are
harbored . . . This most primitive part of our brain is essential for our
survival.
Our limbic system is generally where emotion is processed. A sensory
stimulant comes into the brain through our eyes, ears, skin, or other
organs, and we experience an emotive response to it ....
• . . The top of the brain is divided between the left and the right
hemisphere. The left is primarily associated with verbal skills-
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same across genders, differences in male and female brain
development appear in the structure, function, response,
and chemical and hormonal composition of the brain.
Differences also arise in laboratory situations where human
subjects are tested on their cognitive ability to perform
certain tasks.
Brain development is best understood as a spectrum of
development, rather than two poles designated female and
male.8 3 Some children's brains develop more consistently
with typical female characteristics; others' develop typically
male characteristics.8 4 Such development usually breaks
down
by gender, with girls
manifesting female
characteristics and boys manifesting male characteristics.
Yet, some children demonstrate characteristics in the
opposite gender's development spectrum.85 The major sex
differences in brain development, structure, and function lie
8 6
in patterns of ability rather than in levels of intelligence.
In other words, two individuals may have different
cognitive abilities, but have the same level of intelligence.
(1) Developmental Differences. Differences in the male
and female development spectrums are most evident in the
pace at which boys' and girls' brains mature. In most cases,
girls' brains mature earlier than boys.8 7 An example of this
is myelination, the process by which the nerves that spiral
around the shaft of other nerves in the brain are coated
with myelin. Myelin allows electrical impulses to travel
down the nerves with efficiency.8 8 Myelination occurs into
the early twenties, but is completed earlier in women than
in men.8 9 Similarly, the Arcuate fasciculus, the curving
bundle of nerve fibers in the central nervous system,
develops earlier in girls and facilitates females' speech in
speaking, reading, and writing-and the right is primarily associated
with spatial skills, such as measuring, perceiving direction, and
working with blocks or other objects.
Id. at 18.
83. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 16.

84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, 12 SCI. AM. 32, 32-37
(2002), availableat http://www.sciam.com/printversion.cfm?articlelD=
00018E9D-879D-1D06-8E49809EC588EEDF.
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sentence form earlier than in males. 90 Because these
differences involve the pace of development, male brains
eventually catch up to female brains in the myelination
process as well as in the development of the Arcuate
fasciculus.91
Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that parts of the
female brain are more developed than the male brain,
particularly the prefrontal lobes, where sensory processing
often occurs. 92 Girls are able to absorb more sensory data
than boys. On average, they hear better, smell better, and
93
receive more information through fingertips and skin.
Because female brains also have stronger connections
between neurons in the cerebellum and spinal cord, girls
generally have superior language ability and fine-motor
skills.

94

(2) Structural Differences. The differences in the size,
weight, and thickness of specific areas of the brain also
generate gender-specific cognitive abilities. The cerebral
cortex, which contains neurons that support higher
intellectual functions is thicker on the right side of the
brain in males and thicker on the left side in females. 95 As
such, males are likely to be right-brain dominant while
females tend to be left-brain dominant. 96 The corpus
callosum, the bundle of nerves that connects the brain's
right and left hemispheres, is approximately twenty percent
larger in females than in males, giving girls better
connections between hemispheres of the brain. 97 The
amygdala, part of the limbic system involved in emotional
processing, is larger in male brains, and in turn causes

87. See GURIAN, supra note 14, at 19.
88. See id. at 26.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 20.
91. See id. at 20-21.
92. See id. at 27.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 20.
95. See id. at 21.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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males to be more aggressive than females. 98 The
hippocampus, the ridge along the lower section of each
lateral ventricle of the brain responsible for memory
storage, is also larger in female brains than in male
brains. 99 The number and speed of neuron transmissions in
this area are higher in the female brain than in the male
brain. 10 0 This difference accounts for enhanced memory
storage in females. 10
While these basic differences in structure have been
identified over the last decade, recent discoveries in
additional structural differences have emerged in the past
year. Researchers at the University of New Mexico and
University of California-Irvine have employed imaging
techniques to show that men's and women's brains are
wired differently.' 0 2 The research documents differences in
the quantity of gray and white matter in the male and
female brain. 10 3 Men and women need both white matter
and gray matter to have normal thought processes. 04 Gray
matter is the thinking part of the brain, and processes
information on the surface of the brain; white matter is the
connection between the regions of the brain, which enable
the brain to function as a whole. 1o5 Men have 6.5 times
more gray matter than women, and women have about nine
times more white matter than men. 0 6 Using MRI samples,
the researchers found that in men, the greatest volume of

98. See id. at 20.
99. See id. at 22.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Jackie Jadrnak, Male, Female Brains Differ, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan.
24, 2005, at Al (citing Richard Haier et al., Structural Brain Variation and
General Intelligence, 23 NEUROIMAGE 425 (2004)), available at 2005 WLNR
1049177.
103. See id.; Krista Pino, Research Finds Male, Female Brains Differ, DAILY
LOBO, Jan. 27, 2005 (citing Richard Haier et al., Structural Brain Variation and
General Intelligence, 23 NEUROIMAGE 425 (2004)), available at http://www.
dailylobo.com (select "Search" hyperlink; then select "Krista Pino" as "Author"
and Jan. 27, 2005 as "Issue").
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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gray matter was in bilateral frontal lobes and in the left
pariental lobes. 10 7 In female subjects, the strongest amount
of gray matter was in the right frontal lobe and the largest
cluster was found in the area where language is
the male brain churns
processed.' 0 8 Accordingly,
information, while the female brain distributes information
to different regions of the brain. 10 9 While the two methods
achieve the same result, males and females generally use
different patterns of brain activity to solve problems.
(3) Chemical and Hormonal Differences. Differences in
brain development and cognition also arise from distinct
chemical and hormonal levels in male and female brains.
Males and females have different amounts of most brain
chemicals. For example, the male brain secretes less
serotonin than the female brain. 110 Lower levels of
serotonin in the male brain make males more impulsive
and fidgety than females."' On the other hand, the female
brain secretes more ocytocin than the male brain, which
immediate
makes the female more capable of quick and
2
empathic response to others' pain and needs."
Although both the male and female brains possess all
the human hormones, the degree of dominance of hormones
differs in each gender's brain. 113 Females are dominated by
estrogen and progesterone, and males are dominated by
testosterone. Progesterone is the female growth and
bonding hormone. 114 Testosterone is the male growth and
sex-drive and aggression hormone." 5 Estrogen is more
present in females, lowering their aggression, competition,
self-assertion, and self-reliance. 1 6 Testosterone is much

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 28.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 21.
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aggression,
more present in males, and in males increases
117
competition, self-assertion, and self-reliance.
The varying degree of these hormones in the brain
accounts for differences in male and female classroom
behavior and peer interaction. Upon meeting new people,
females tend to bond first and ask questions later, while
males tend to be aggressive. 118 In group situations, a girl is
more likely to manage social bonds through egalitarian
alliances, while a boy tends to manage social energy
through a hierarchy achieved by striving for dominance. 119
The hormone, melatonin, also leads to different
classroom strategies. The concentration of melatonin in
females is much greater than in males. 120 Melatonin, a
hormone produced by the pineal body, lightens skin
pigmentation and is inhibited by sunlight. 121 The greater
concentration of melatonin in females may partially explain
why females have an increased sensitivity to bright light.
Differences in males and females' occipital lobe may explain
low light, while males
why females see and work better in 122
see and work better in brighter light.
Evidence also suggests that the dimorphic effects of sex
hormones on brain organization occur early in life. 123 Early
in development, male testosterone slows the growth of the
brain's left hemisphere and accelerates the growth of the
right hemisphere. 2 4 Researcher Baron-Cohen filmed oneyear-old children at play and measured the eye contact they
made with their mothers. 25 He looked at various social
factors (birth order and parental education among others),
as well as the level of testosterone the child had been
117. Id. at 26.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id.
120.

See id. at

23.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See KIMURA, supra note 86, at 32.
124. See Hara Estroff Marano, The New Sex Scorecard, PSYCHO. TODAY,
Aug. 2003, at 38, 44 (citing SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE
(2003)).
125. Id.
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exposed to in his fetal life. 126 The research showed that the
more testosterone children were exposed to in the womb,
the less they were able to make eye contact with their
mother. 127 Testosterone levels during fetal life also
influenced the children's language skills. 128 High levels of
prenatal testosterone correlated with smaller vocabularies
in children at eighteen months and again at twenty-four
adrenal
months. 129 Conditions such as congenital
hyperplasia (CAH), in which the fetus is exposed to
unusually high levels of adrenal androgens, suggest
another significant gender connection between prenatal
hormone differences and learning. 130 Girls with CAH score
better on standardized spatial testing than their unaffected
siblings. 131 These girls also prefer the same kind of toys
that boys prefer. 132
Sex hormones vary naturally across the time of month
in women, and across the time of year in men. 133 Variations
in cognitive patterns relate directly to fluctuations in these
gender-specific hormone levels. 134 The level of estrogen in
women is highest mid-cycle and elevates again for a few
days prior to the next menstruation. 135 Studies have found
that women score better at spatial tasks when their
estrogen levels are lowest, and excel in fluency and fine
motor tasks when their estrogen levels are highest. 3 6 Men's
testosterone levels change throughout the year. 137 They are
138
usually higher in the autumn and lower in the spring.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Doreen Kimura, Biological Constraints to Parity Between the Sexes,
PSYNOPSIS, Winter 2001, at 3.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Doreen Kimura, Sex Hormones Influence Human Cognitive Pattern,
23 NEURO ENDOCRINOLOGY LETTERS, Dec. 2002, at 67, 76.

134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 77.
138. See id.
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Men with low to normal levels of testosterone generally
perform better on spatial tests than men with normal to
high levels. 139 Men perform better40on spatial problems in
the spring than they do in the fall. 1
gender
Functional Differences. Functional
(4)
differences in the brain also shed light on the different
cognitive processes employed by males and females. The
male and female brain use different cell and blood activity
within the brain. 141 Through positron emission tomography
scans (PET) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
researchers have concluded that boys use the right
hemisphere of their brains to a greater degree than the left;
girls use the left more than the right. 142 The left
hemisphere processes language, reading, writing, math,
verbal thoughts and memory, temporal, sequential
language, linguistic consciousness, conscious self-image,
and
defense mechanisms, projection, self-deception,
denial. 143 The right hemisphere interprets emotional
contents; tone of voice; facial expressions; gestures; melodic
speech; social, musical, visual, spatial, and environmental
awareness; unconscious self-image, body image, and
emotional and visual memory. 144 While boys use the right
side of their brain to work on abstract problems, girls use
both sides of their brains. 145 This difference makes males
more comfortable with spatial relationships. 146 The left
hemisphere is usually more developed in the female brain,
which creates female comfortability with listening,
communication, and language-based learning. 147 Hence,
when women and men are asked to do a rhyming task, men

139. See id.
140. See id.
141. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 29.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 22.
144. Id. at 24.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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of the brain while women use
primarily use the left side
8
both sides of the brain.14
The PET and MRI technology also reveals that the
149
resting female brain is as active as the active male brain.
There is fifteen percent more blood flow in the female brain
than in the male brain. 150 The female brain uses more
resources faster, more often, and in more places in the
151
brain, which gives the female brain a learning advantage.
Males tend to manage stimulants with more of "task focus."
Because the male brain is not as activated in as many
places as the female brain, it becomes overwhelmed by
stimulation more quickly than the female brain, causing it
to decide on the importance of stimulants for the task at
hand. 152 The male brain has an advantage in this functional
153
difference because it takes a quick, direct route to a goal.
The disadvantage is that if the task fails, the male has
fewer resources at work to redirect himself. 154 Male brains
not only operate with less blood flow than girls' brains, they
are also structured to compartmentalize learning. 55 Thus,
girls tend to multitask better than boys do, with few
attention span problems and56greater ability to make quick
transitions between lessons.
More specifically, different parts of the brain function
at a higher level in females than in males. Females have
greater functioning in memory and sensory intake. 57 Girls
can store a greater quantity of seemingly random
information for a short time period. Boys are able to store
data more often, but only if the information is organized or

148. Joel Hughes, Brain Research Finds Gender Link: Med School Team
Discovers Sexes Think Differently, YALE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 1995, available at

http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=8295.
149. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 29.
150. Michael Gurian & Kathy Stevens, With Boys and Girls in Mind, 62
EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP: CLOSING ACHIEVEMENT GAPS 21, 22 (2004).

151. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 29.
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Gurian & Stevens, supra note 150, at 122.
156. Id.
157. GURIAN, supra note 14, at 30.
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has specific importance to them. 158 On the other hand, boys
can store trivia better than girls and for a longer period of
time. 15 9 The precise area of the brain responsible for
grammatical structures and word production is more active
in females and accounts for improved verbal communication
skills in females. 160 Similarly, the frontal lobe in the female
brain is more active than in the male brain. 161 The frontal
lobe facilitates speech, thought, and emotion and produces
neurons for skilled movement. 162 The higher activity in this
for their improved verbal
area in females accounts
63
communication skills.
Other parts of the brain are more active in males than
in females. The Basal Ganglia, which controls movement
sequences, is quicker to engage in the male brain than in
the female brain. 164 Accordingly, males generally respond
65
quickly to attention demands in a physical environment.
The limbic system in a female brain is at rest to a greater
extent than in a male brain. 166 Because the female limbic
system is less active, it moves sensory data up to the
neocortex more rapidly than in the male system. 16 7 The
neocortex is in the upper part of the brain, where most
complex thought occurs. Unlike girls, boys take emotive
material processed by the limbic system, and route it down
from the limbic system to the brain stem, found in the
of the brain, where
lowest portion and most primitive part
168
fight-or-flight responses are harbored.
(5) Differences Found in the Lab. Sex differences in
problem solving have been studied in adults in laboratory

158. Id. at 31.
159. Id. at 31.
160. Id. at 20.
161. See id. at 21.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 20.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 22.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 22, 29.

HeinOnline -- 53 Buff. L. Rev. 1088 2005-2006

2005]

GENDER DIFFERENTIATION

1089

situations. 169 On average, men perform better than women
at certain spatial tasks. 170 In particular, men are superior
at tests that require the subject to imagine rotating or
manipulating an object. 171 Men also outperform women in
mathematical reasoning tests and in navigating their way
through a route. 172 In one study, men completed a
computer-simulated maze more quickly and with fewer
errors than women did.173 In another study using a tabletop
map, men learned a route in fewer trials and with fewer
174
errors, but women remembered more of the landmarks.
These results suggest that women use landmarks as a
strategy to orient themselves in everyday life more than
that women actually have
men do. 175 Studies have shown
176
superior landmark memory.
Researchers have also tested the ability of individuals
to recall objects and their locations within a confined space.
In these studies, women were better able to remember
whether items had changed places or remember the
locations of pictures on cards that were turned over in
pairs. 77 At this kind of object location, in contrast with
other spatial tasks, women appear to have an advantage.
While it used to be thought that sex differences in problem
solving do not occur until puberty, recent evidence suggests
that some cognitive and skill differences are present much
earlier. Researchers have found that three and four-yearold boys are better at targeting and mentally rotating
178
figures within a clock face than are three-year-old girls.
Studies show therefore that men outperform women at
tasks that require hitting a target or intercepting a moving

169. KIMURA, supra note 84.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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target. 179 This advantage does not depend on strength, or
active knowledge of sports history. 180 Instead, research
suggests that this divergence is rooted in the male ability to
targets with large amplitude aiming
coordinate spatial
181
movements.
While some research indicates that women are superior
82
in most verbal tasks, this is not necessarily the case.
Adult women do better on tasks that test verbal memory
and verbal fluency, but not on vocabulary or verbal
reasoning. 8 3 Verbal fluency is the ability to generate
particular words or phrases. 8 4 Verbal memory is the ability
employing words in lists or meaningful
to recall material,
paragraphs. 185
b) Gender Differences in Brain Development Create
Gender Differences in Learning Strategies. Learning style is
defined as an individual's characteristic way of processing
information, feeling, and behaving in learning situations. 8 6
Similarly, knowing is defined as the way an individual
processes and acquires information. 8 7 Through numerous
studies, researchers have found that men and women
utilize gender specific knowledge processing. While the
research indicates that there is little variance in knowledge
based academic performance, men and women do use
different techniques in processing information.
Researchers have found that males are generally
visual, tactile or kinesthetic learners, while women are
auditory learners. In a study of high school (adolescent-age)

179. Kimura, supra note 129, at 66, 67.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Marge Philbin, Elizabeth Meier, Sherri Huffman and Patricia Boverie,
A Survey of Gender and Learning Styles, 32 SEx ROLES 485 (1995); see also
TOMLINSON & ALLAN, supra note 13, at 20-23.
187. Michelle K. Ryan & Barbara David, Gender Differences in Ways of
Knowing, 49 SEX ROLES 693 (2003).
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students, researchers investigated gender differences
among the learning styles of 1,367 adolescents from five
countries (Bermuda, Brunei, Hungary, Sweden, and New
Zealand). 188 Statistical analysis included a multivariate
analysis of variance with twenty-two dependent variables
(learning-style elements) and between two subject variables
(gender and country).18 9 In nine of the twenty-two learning
style variables, male students were found to be more visual,
tactile or kinesthetic learners, whereas female students
tended to be more auditory learners. 190 Female students
were consistently more conforming, authority-orientated,
and parent-motivated or self-motivated than their male
classmates were.191
Nonetheless, when researchers examined the individual
findings of the participants, and used them to prepare
individual homework assignments on the basis of each
student's learning preferences, there were no two identical
learning-style profiles within each gender group for the
twenty-two variables. 92 This result indicates, that although
girls and boys' learning styles differ from each other in
many ways, individuals within the gender groupings were
even more unique than either group as a whole. 93 When
students were taught with an individualized learning-style
students'
approach,
the
instructional
responsive
standardized achievement attitude test scores improved
significantly. 94 Accordingly, educators who respect and
address the learning-style difference found across genders
achieved
and among individuals in the classroom have
195
significant achievement gains for their students.
Not only do males and females seem to have gender
specific preferences regarding which sense is invoked in the

188. Andrea Hingfeld & Rita Dunn, High School Male and Female
Learning-Style Similaritiesand Differences in Diverse Nations, 96 J. EDUC. RES.
195 (2003).
189. Id. at 195.
190. See id. at 203-04.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 204.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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intake of knowledge, researchers have found that males and
females differ in their approach to learning motives and
strategies. Motive refers to the reason why students
approach learning tasks, while strategy refers to the
methods and habits they engage in to accomplish the
task. 196 Motives and strategies can be divided into three
categories: surface, deep, and achievement motives and
strategies. 197 Surface motives include fear of failure in the
desire to achieve an academic degree. Such a motive may
generate surface strategies such as memorizing learning
material without first comprehending it. 198 Deep motives,
on the other hand, entail an intrinsic interest in the subject,
and a desire for understanding the material. 199 The deep
motive usually drives students to deep strategies like
taking the initiative to find out more about a topic and
seeing links among different concepts. 200 Finally, the
achievement-motivated student is driven to competition
with peers, and employs strategies such as choosing
modules that he or she feels confident in, and studying
insofar as it is pertinent to an academic
material deeply
201
assessment.
Although the differences were small, a study tracking
National University of Singapore students' cumulative
average point scores (CAP) indicated that males utilized
deep motive strategies and achievement motive strategies
more than females. 202 Males scored higher on abstract
conceptualization, which indicated a preference for deep
strategies, logical thinking, and rational evaluation. In
contrast, when females used a deep approach, they looked
for personal connections and relevance with the learning
material. 203 The researchers hypothesized that female
196. Lim Yuen Lie et. al., How do Male and Female Students Approach
Learning at NUS?, CDTL BRIEF (Ctr. For Dev. of Teaching and Learning,
Sing.), Jan. 2004, at 1.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 2.
203. Id.
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students scored lower on deep strategies because they found
it more difficult to relate some course material to their
20 4
personal experiences.
Similarly, Sabine Severiens and Geert Ten Dam cite to
Baxter Magolda's study on ways of knowing, which
concluded that women, when reasoning about knowledge,
tend to focus on relational aspects, while men take a more
individualistic approach. 20 5 Baxter Magolda performed a
longitudinal study in which both collegiate women and men
were questioned about their ways of knowing. 206 Over the
course of the study, Baxter Magolda observed her students
developing from an absolute and factual way of knowing to
a relative and contextual way. 20 7 But while going through
these stages, women appeared to use different patterns of
reasoning compared to men. 20 8 In general, the patterns
more often used by women can be characterized by a focus
on relational aspects. While reasoning about knowledge,
women seem to be receptive to other perspectives and to
integrate those perspectives into their own. 20 9 The pattern
210
more often used by men includes an individual focus.
Men are more often focused on their own learning processes
and perspectives. 211 In Sabine Severiens and Geert Ten
Dam's study which compared two theories of knowing,
learning patterns were indeed gender related, but more for
men than women. 212 More than half the women used the
receiving, interpersonal, and interindividual patterns while
nearly all men used the mastering,
impersonal, and
213
individual patterns of reasoning.

204. See id.
205. Sabine Severiens & Geert Ten Dam, Gender and Learning: Comparing
Two Theories, 35 HIGHER EDUC. 329 (1998) (citing M.B. BAXTER MAGOLDA,
KNOWING AND REASONING IN COLLEGE: GENDER-RELATED PATTERNS IN STUDENTS'
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1992)).

206. Id. at 331.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 343.
213. Id.
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The idea of gender related differences in the way people
acquire and process information, with men utilizing
separate knowing and women utilizing connected knowing,
was challenged in a study by Michelle Ryan and Barbara
David. 214 The researchers defined separate knowing as the
process utilized when learners distance themselves from
the object of knowledge and place an emphasis on
objectivity, reason, doubting, analysis, and evaluation. 215 In
contrast, connected knowing emphasized understanding,
empathy, acceptance, and collaboration. 216 The data
collected from this study supported an analysis of ways of
knowing which were context dependent, and which
questioned the notion that knowing is intrinsically related
to gender. 217 The participants' connected and separate
knowing was found to be highly dependent upon the social
context and not on gender per se. 218 Whereas, when gender
differences were found in separate knowing, with men
showing higher levels of separate knowing than women,
this difference occurred when gender was made salient. 219
When participants were asked to focus on the groups to
which they did or did not belong, and on the similarities
and differences between themselves and the other group
members,
a
different
pattern
emerged. 220 Those
participants in the in-group context displayed significantly
higher levels of connected knowing than did those
participants in the out-group context. 221 Difference in scores
from the in-groups context also indicated that they placed a
greater emphasis on connected knowing than on separate
knowing.222

214. Michelle K. Ryan & Barbara David, Gender Differences in Ways of
Knowing: The Context Dependence of the Attitude Towards Thinking and
Learning Survey, 49 SEx ROLES 693, 693 (2003).

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 698-99.

218. Id. at 698.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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Not only do men and women differ as to their
preferences of style of learning and ways of knowing, they
223
also employ different study strategies to learn material.
When researchers have examined spontaneous study
strategies of male and female students, results show that
men use more covert study strategies and women use more
overt study strategies. 224 In an analysis of spontaneous
study, where participants (applicants for Medical school)
were asked to comprehend and answer questions about
philosophical and statistical texts, researchers gauged the
manner in which male and female students approached the
texts, as well as the effect 225
of the strategies they employed
on their learning outcomes.
When men and women approached the philosophical
text, their study strategies differed. Of male participants,
almost twelve percent did not produce any physical records
(covert strategy), whereas only two percent of women
produced no records. 226 Female participants, on the
average, took notes more eagerly than the male subjects
(overt strategy).227 The proportions of those participants
who drew concept maps, or underlined the text, were the
same among both genders. 228 There were no differences
between men and women in their overall achievement
levels. 229 Instead, it appeared that both genders performed
the more generative study
better in text comprehension
230
strategies they used.
When men and women's study strategies in the
statistical text were analyzed, again, the gender groups
differed in their study strategies. Comparable to the results
from the philosophical text, the percentage of male
participants who did not use any overt study strategy in

223. See Virpi Slotte, Kirsti Lonka & Sari Lindblom Yldnne, Study-Strategy
Use in Learning from the Text: Does Gender Make Any Difference?, 29
INSTRUCTIONAL SCI. 255 (2001).

224. See id. at 261.
225. See id. at 256.
226. Id. at 261.
227. Id.

228. Id.
229. See id. at 262.
230. See id. at 265.
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learning from the statistical text was considerably higher
than the female participants. 231 Female participants took
summary notes on the average more often than the male
participants, and the proportion of participants who drew
concept maps was slightly higher among women than
among men. 232 In both studies (of philosophical text and of
statistical text) clear gender differences in spontaneous
strategy use were found. Again, while the participants'
(men and women) study strategies differed in approaching
the statistical text, female and male participants did not
differ in text comprehension. 233 The evidence indicates that
gender differences lie in patterns
of study activity rather
234
than on levels of performance.
Such evidence is consistent with the overwhelming data
demonstrating
that
gender
differences
in
brain
development lead most females to employ learning
strategies that are significantly different from most males.
If, in fact, there are-as a rule-significant gender
differences in learning strategies, how should these
differences inform the Supreme Court's Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence?

III. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
THAT DIFFERENTIATE BASED ON GENDER IS CONTRARY
TO THE EQUALITY MAXIM

A. The Equality Maxim's ProperPlace in Equal Protection
Clause Analysis.
Genuine allegiance to the equality maxim in
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause would lead courts
to four analytical parameters.
First, governmental action that treats persons
differently would be unconstitutional where those persons
are determined to be the same. For example, a
governmental program that allows only white students to
231. Id.
232. Id.

233. See id.
234. See id.
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attend a state law school would be unconstitutional because
it treats white students differently from nonwhite students
23 5
where such students are determined to be the same.
Similarly, as the court held in Frontiero v. Richardson,236 a
Congressional scheme that gave to servicemen the benefit
of claiming their spouses as medical dependents but denied
that benefit to servicewomen constituted an "unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen. ''237 In his
plurality opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that gender
should be a "suspect class" and that the statute's
classification of gender in the interest of administrative
convenience could not be sustained. In his concurrence,
Justice Powell (together with Justice Burger and Justice
Blackman) resisted the inclusion of women within "suspect
classes," but agreed that the statute created an
unconstitutional distinction between men and women
without a rational basis. Significantly, although Justice
Brennan argued forcefully for giving women "suspect class"
status, he concluded ultimately that the statute at issue
would fail the rational basis standard as well. 238 Justice
Brennan contends that "any statutory scheme which draws
such a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose
of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily
commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are . . .similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
[Constitution]. '239 The Equal Protection Clause thus
from men, so long as
prohibits treating women differently
they are determined to be the same. 240

235. See e.g., Sipuel v. Bd. Of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632, 632-33 (1948)
(Equal Protection Clause requires Oklahoma to provide some codes to instate
legal education to both black and white students); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding that the state's provision of legal
education within the state for white students only violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
236. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
237. Frontiero,411 U.S. at 679.
238. See id. at 684 (citing Reed v. Reed, 407 U.S. at 76, 77).
239. Id. at 609 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 77, 76 (1971)).
240. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996) (holding
that the Virginia Military Institute's refusal to admit women to its unique
institution constituted a denial of equal protection).
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Second, governmental action that treats persons alike
who are determined to be alike would be consistent with the
equality principle within the Equal Protection Clause. For
example, a governmental program requiring families to pay
a user fee for bus transportation to school treats all families
determined to be alike in their proximity to the school in
the same way. 2 41 Similarly, a state statute that mandates
the retirement of public employees at a certain age treats
persons determined to be alike in their age in the same
way.242

Third, governmental action that treats persons
differently who are determined to be different would also be
consistent with the maxim of equality. In Rostker v.
Goldberg,243 the Court upheld the Congressional decision to
exclude women from registration for the draft for military
combat positions. The Court concluded that the "gender
classification" realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not "similarly situated for purposes of a draft or
registration for a draft."244 In Schlesinger v. Ballard as well,
the Court upheld a Navy policy that gave females a longer
period than males to attain promotions necessary to
continued military service. 245 The Court reasoned that "the
different treatment of men and women naval officers . . .
reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but
instead, the demonstratable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect
to opportunities for professional service. ' 246
In Rostker, the Court declared: "[t]he Constitution
requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons
similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial
equality. '247 This same logic, of course, would lead to a

241. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public School, 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (holding
that North Dakota's requirement of a user fee for school bus transportation did
not deny students unable to afford the fee equal protection).
242. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976).
243. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
244. Id. at 78.
245. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
246. Id. at 507-08.
247. 453 U.S. at 79.
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presumption of constitutionality for governmental programs
that treat persons differently because of their race or
gender where racial or gender differences are determined to
exist.
Finally, governmental programs that treat persons
alike who are determined to be different would be
unconstitutional, in violation of the equal protection's
principal of equality. For instance, Virginia's statue
subjecting all voters to a poll tax would be unconstitutional
to the extent it was determined that persons subjected to
that similar tax are in fact dissimilar in a significant
way. 248 By that same logic, governmental programs that
treat all persons the same regardless of race or gender
would be unconstitutional where it was determined that
there were significant racial or gender differences.
As these possibilities demonstrate, a presumption
against laws that treat unlike cases in a like manner is just
as consistent with the maxim of equality within the Equal
Protection Clause. That maxim certainly does not support
the current presumption against the unconstitutionality of
laws that treat students differently based on gender unless
the Court determines that such students are in fact alike.
Yet, the Court generally does not perform any serious
analysis of whether the persons affected by the law are in
fact like cases. The Carolene Products footnote, which was
designed to justify treating some classes differently from
others, has led the Court to presume that those classes
should be treated the same as others. Perhaps the
assumption that persons should be treated the same
regardless of race or gender has led the Court to presume
that they are in fact the same. Accordingly, the Court
presumes that governmental programs that classify persons
based on race or gender are unconstitutional absent a
showing that the different treatment is at least
persuasively justified by some important governmental
policy. Yet, the Court never really determines whether the
persons treated are in fact like cases. The Court is willing
to engage in moral determinations about whether
differential legal treatments are appropriate, but generally
is unwilling to engage in factual determinations about

248. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 53 Buff. L. Rev. 1099 2005-2006

1100

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

whether persons affected by governmental programs are
actually different.
In fact, the Court has hinted at its ability to do so. In
Michael M. v. Superior Court,249 the Court declared that,
"the Equal Protection Clause does not . . .require 'things
which are different in fact ...to be treated in law as though
they were the same.' ' 250 Significantly, the Court addressed
the question of whether men and women were in fact
different in such a way as to make appropriate a statute
criminalizing the act of sexual intercourse with a minor
female, but not the act of sexual intercourse with a minor
male. In doing so, the Court declared: "We need not be
medical doctors to discern that young men and young
women are not similarly situated with respect to the
problems and risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may
become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the
profound
physical,
emotional
and
psychological
consequences of sexual activity. ' 25 1 The Court also reasoned
that the risk of pregnancy deters females from engaging in
sexual intercourse with minor males and constitutes a
"natural" gender difference justifying the law's different
treatment. In light of the "natural" differences between men
and women, the Court concluded that "[a] criminal sanction
imposed solely on males thus serves to 'equalize' the
deterrents on the sexes. ' 252 Because men and women are
not alike, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that
the law treat them as if they were.
B. Governmental Programs That Recognize Racial
Differences In Education OpportunitiesShould Not Be
Presumed To Be Unconstitutional.
The recognition of actual racial differences in
educational opportunities would justify (if not mandate)

249. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
250. Id. at 464 (1981) (citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966));
see also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
251. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471.
252. Id. at 473.
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governmental programs that treated African-Americans
differently from white Americans in the aspects to which
they are adjudged to be different. Any educational program
that failed to recognize and remedy these differences in
be
presumed
would
opportunities
educational
unconstitutional because the law would treat unlike cases
in a like manner.
In its Gratz decision, however, the Supreme Court
effectively presumes the unconstitutionality of any serious
effort by the government to recognize racial differences in
educational opportunities. In Gratz, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions policy, reasoning: "[w]e find that
the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority'
applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the interest in educational diversity .... ,,253 The
undergraduate policy fails because, unlike the law school's
policy upheld in Grutter, it does not provide for "meaningful
individualized review of applicants. ' 254 Instead, the
undergraduate program violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it treats "every underrepresented minority
the same .. ."255
Appealing again to the sentiment of equality, the court
concludes that the University's race-conscious policy
subjects non-minority applicants to "unequal treatment."
The Court's rhetoric conceals its substantive judgment
about the presumed similarities between underrepresented
minorities and other applicants. Based on the rhetoric of
equality, the Court presumes that underrepresented
minorities should be treated like all other applicants. To
presume that race-conscious remedies violate the equality
principle is to presume that no racial differences exist. If
underrepresented minorities are not actually like other
applicants in their educational opportunities, then treating
them as if they were like those other applicants cannot be
fairly justified by the equality principle.

253. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
254. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
255. Id.
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As Justice Ginsburg suggests in her Gratz dissent, to
judge educational programs which benefit AfricanAmericans the same way as programs which injure them is
to ignore the history and contemporary reality of differences
in educational opportunity. 256 Although the Court employs
the rhetoric of equality, its holding is really based on its
political judgment that significant racial differences in
educational opportunity should have little constitutional
significance.
C. Governmental ProgramsThat Recognize Gender
Differences in LearningStrategies Should Not be
Presumed to be Unconstitutional.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's presumptions, all of
the available credible research indicates that there are
material differences in the cognitive processes generally
employed by men and women. 257 For example, research
indicates that in the elementary grades, gender differences
in the biological development of the brain generally enable
girls to see and to read better than boys in low light, while
boys are able to see and to read better than girls in bright
light.258

Accordingly, a governmental program that provides for
"bright light" throughout a public school may violate the
equality principle as much as a governmental program that
prevents female students from taking science classes. A
policy providing uniform "bright light" treats unlike cases
in a like manner. It treats female students the same as
male students, even though their opportunities to learn at
an "equal" level of light are fundamentally different. The
consistent use of bright light injures female students by

256. Id. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
257. See YUPIN BAE ET AL., TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN, 60-69 (2000); MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 138 (1994); GURIAN, supra note 14, at 57-59
(explaining how the brain affects why girls on average do not like math as much
as boys and boys generally do not like reading and writing as much"); id. at 3637, 59, 66, 294; Linda L. Peter, What Remains of Public Choice and Parental
Rights: Does the VMI Decision Preclude Exclusive Schools or Classes Based
upon Gender?, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 249 (1997).
258. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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denying them an educational opportunity. Yet, the courts
likely would not presume that such a program violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Nor would any showing of an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" have to be made to
justify this apparent "equal" treatment of boys and girls. On
the other hand, an educational policy which enables male
students, but not female students, to take science classes
treats people differently even though men and women may
be adjudged to be the same in their capacity to learn
science. That policy will receive heightened judicial scrutiny
because it appears to treat like cases in an unlike manner.
The real issue in both cases, however, is not equality; it
is whether governmental programs injure female students
by denying them an educational opportunity. The programs
should both be suspect, not because they are unequal, but
because they injure female students' opportunities to learn.
If male and female students are adjudged to be alike in
their entitlement to the opportunity to learn, then any
governmental program which denies that opportunity
would not treat like cases in a like manner. The substantive
value is the opportunity to learn, not equality.
A program of gender-segregation in education,
therefore, may be fairly attacked simply because it appears
to be "unequal." In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, the Supreme Court expressly declined to reach "the
question of whether States can provide 'separate but equal'
undergraduate institutions for males and females. ' 259 There
is a significant body of research suggesting that girls and
boys alike benefit from segregated classrooms. 260 The

259. 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982).
260. Peter, supra note 257, at 264 (citing SADKER & SADKER, supra note 257,
at 234); Meg Milne Moulton & Whitney Ransome, Op-Ed., With few
distractions,students will do better, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 26,
2003, available at http://www.ncgs.org/type2.php?pid=news ("[Jjn a 2000 survey
of 4,200 girls' school graduates, more than eighty percent reported they were
better prepared to succeed in the coed world precisely because they went to a
single-sex school."). Without boys in the classroom, girls speak up more, take
more science and math courses, obtain more advanced degrees and hold more
high ranking positions in large companies. Id. See also Kay Bailey Hutchinson,
The Lesson of Single-Sex Public Education:Both Successful and Constitutional,
50 AM. U.L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2001) (citing Susan Estrich, Ideologues Decry
Single-Sex Education, But Girls Benefit, DENY. POST, May 22, 1998, at Bll);
Julia Morgan School for Girls, Why a Girls' School?, available at
http://www.juliamorganschool.org/girls.html ("Girls at single-sex schools . . .
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American Civil Liberties Union, however, argues that
"[s]ingle-sex education is at best a 'sound-good method'
because it is based upon misconceptions about the abilities
and preferences of girls and boys rather than empirical
evidence."'261 The debate in the courts and in the political
sector will no doubt be peppered with appeals to equality.
Yet, the principle of equality is unhelpful; it both supports
and opposes gender segregation in education. The real issue
is whether gender-segregation injures women by denying
them a substantive right to educational opportunity, and
whether the courts will recognize that injury.
Similarly, a governmental program that differentiates
between male students and female students within a coeducational environment is consonant with equal protection
where the differentiation corresponds with the proven
gender differences in learning strategy. In the context of
instructional practices, differentiation is an educator's
response to a learner's needs. 262 Educators differentiate by
"attending to the learning needs of a particular student or
small group of students rather than the more typical
pattern of teaching the class as though all individuals in it
were basically alike. ''263 Differentiation presumes that
students are not alike in their learning, and therefore
instructional practices should be adjusted to meet those
differences. 264 Students differ in their readiness to grapple
typically score thirty percent higher on SAT tests than the girls' national
average. In addition, almost 100 percent of girls' school graduates go on to
college and are twice as likely to earn doctorates.); Peter supra note 257, at 264,
n.107 (suggesting that boys also benefit from single-sex education because they
are more likely to focus on their studies, express themselves more freely and
pursue nontraditional arts and literature degrees).
261. Laura W. Murphy, Single-Sex Notice of Intent, Comments to the
Department of Education (2002), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/edu/
131561eg20020708.html. The ACLU observed that if similar characteristics
found in single-sex schools, such as smaller classrooms, extensive resources,
well-trained teachers, and advanced educational methods were available in
public (co-ed) schools, measurable differences between single-sex education and
co-educational programs would disappear. Id. The ACLU also argues that
single-sex schools undermine Title IX, violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and foster sex discrimination. Id.
262. TOMLINSON & ALLAN, supra note 13, at 3.
263. Id. at 4.
264. Id. at 5.
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with a particular idea or skill, in their interests and in their
learning strategies. 265 In the differentiated classroom, the
teacher identifies those differences and responds to them by
providing tailored content, activities and assessment tools.
Differentiation does not always require different tasks for
every learner, but it does require "just enough flexibility in
task complexity, working arrangements, and modes of
learning expression that varied students find learning a
good fit much of the time. '266
In shaping their instructional practices to meet the
different needs of their students, educators must identify
differences in student readiness, engagement and learning
strategies. In order to differentiate based on student
readiness, the teacher "constructs tasks or provides
' 267
learning choices at different levels of difficulty."
Differentiation based on engagement requires educators to
adjust their instructional techniques in accordance with the
external interests of each student or group of students.
Students with an interest in fine arts for example may be
exposed to the content of a "history lesson" through the eyes
of painters from the historical period, whereas students
with an athletic interest may receive the same "history
lesson" from the perspective of the period's athletes.
Finally, in a differentiated classroom, educators attempt to
identify and respond to their students' different learning
strategies. Instructional practices are designed to fit
students' learning styles, intelligences and talents. For
example, students identified as "kinesthetic" learners may
be exposed to World War I history by crawling on their
knees through a maze of desks in the classroom designed to
simulate the trenches of warfare.
There is a rich body of thought and empirical evidence
indicating that differentiation in education works.26s In
particular, differentiation to meet the needs of gender
differences in learning strategies can be effective in

265. Id. at 9.

266. Id. at 7.
267. Id. at 9.
268. See TRACEY HALL, NAT'L CTR. FOR ACCESSING THE GEN. CURRICULUM,
DIFFERENTIATED INSTRUCTION: EFFECTIVE CLASSROOM PRACTICES REPORT (2002).
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enhancing the learning of both genders. 26 9 A judicial
presumption against an effective educational program that
recognizes proven differences in male and female learning
strategies thus serves neither the goals of equality nor
education.
CONCLUSION

The classical Greek philosophers believed that
educational practices should be altered to meet the needs of
the regime, not the particular learning strategies of the
students. In The Republic, Plato argues that one of the
primary tasks of educators is to level the various natural
instincts and affections within each student. 270 For
purposes of education, students who have the same "mental
capacity"'271for a particular vocation possess the same
"nature.
The class of individuals with the same capacity
for a certain profession should receive the same education,
and that education must be different from that provided to

269. See e.g., GURIAN, supra note 14; EDWIN S. ELLIS & Lou ANNE
WORTHINGTON, NAT'L CTR. TO IMPROVE THE TOOLS OF EDUCATORS, UNIV. OF OR.,
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS ON EFFECTIVE TEACHING PRINCIPLES AND THE DESIGN OF
QUALITY TOOLS FOR EDUCATORS (1994) (describing how effective teaching and

effective learning include gender differentiation techniques); National Center
for Accessing the General Curriculum, Differentiated Instruction: Effective
Classroom Practices Report 2 (June 2002); Kim L. Pettig, On the Road to
Differentiated Practice, 8 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 14 (2002) (documenting
proven strategies for teachers and schools considering adopting the principles of
differentiated instruction); Sally M. Reis et al., Equal Does Not Mean Identical,
56 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 74 (1998) (advocating that students with different
abilities, interests, and levels of motivation should be offered differentiated
instruction that meets their individual needs to raise achievement); Theodore
R. Sizer, No Two Are Quite Alike: 57 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 6 (1999)
(describing advantages of "personalizing instruction to meet the needs of
students in classrooms); Tomlinson, HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE INSTRUCTION IN
MIXED-ABILITY CLASSROOMS. (2001) (Teachers who attend to individual
differences in their students, including gender differences, are successful.);
TOMLINSON, & ALLAN, supra note 13.
270. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I1, reprinted in STEVEN M. CAHN,
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 59-60
(1997) [hereinafter CAHN]; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V, reprinted in CAHN,
supranote 270, at 74-77.
271. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK V, reprinted in CAHN, supra note 270
at 76.
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the class of students
who have the same capacity for a
272
different profession.
In order to lend credibility to his arguments, Plato goes
as far as to suggest that women and men who have the
capacity for the same particular vocation have the same
natures and should receive the same education. Plato
concludes that "we shall not have one education for men,
and another for women, especially as the nature to be
wrought upon is the same in both cases. No, the education
will be the same ....,,273 All who are determined to be fit for
the office of guardian, for example, will receive the same
guardian education, regardless of gender. Those who are
not determined to be fit for the office of guardian will
receive a very different education, regardless of gender.
Similarly, Aristotle argued that education should not be
adjusted to meet individual differences in learning. He
concluded that education in any particular regime "should
be one and the same for all. '274 Although Aristotle also
recognized that educational strategies such as music should
be differentiated to meet each student's level of maturity,
based only
he allowed for systemic differences in education
275
on the differences in the style government.
The gender-differentiation approach to education has
strongest
roots in the educational psychology of Jean
its
Jacques Rousseau. In the Emile, Rousseau applies to
education his "fundamental maxim" that the "supreme good
is not authority, but freedom. ' 276 Rousseau contends that
students should be educated according to their natural
developmental stages. In order to teach, educators therefore
must understand and attend to the "distinctive genius" of
each child. 277 In language that is compatible with current
brain research and best educational practices, Rousseau

272. See id.
273. Id. ("[T]here are some women who are fit, and others who are unfit, for
the office of guardians.").
274. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK VIII, 1, reprinted in CAHN, supra note 270,
at 137.

275. See id. at 141 ("[T]he young ought to be trained in [music].").
276. JEAN JAQUES RoussEAu,
270, at 167.
277. Id. at 170-71.

EMILE, BOOK II, reprinted in CAHN, supra note
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warns that: "Each mind has a form of its own in conformity
with which it must be directed. If you are a wise man, you
will observe your pupil carefully before saying a word to
him. In the first instance leave his essential character full
liberty to manifest itself. . "278 Where educators find
differences in the character of their pupils, they must tailor
their educational strategies to correspond to those
differences.
In this context, Rousseau attacks the ancient Greek
suggestion that women should be given the same education
as men. 279 According to Rousseau, "[t]he sameness and the
difference" between genders "cannot but have an effect on
mentality. '28 0 The differences in "mentality" do not suggest
in any way superiorities or political inequalities. Yet, those
differences do exist and thus do require different
educational approaches.
After criticizing Plato and Aristotle for ignoring the
"differences of sex" and sacrificing the "sweetest sentiments
of nature" to the "artificial sentiment of loyalty to the
regime," Rousseau concludes: "Once it has been shown that
men and women are essentially different in character and
that they ought not to have the
temperament, it '28follows
1
same education.
Like the ancient Greeks, the Supreme Court can be
criticized for sacrificing the "sweetest sentiments of nature"
to the "artificial sentiment" of equality. Once it has been
shown that men and women are essentially different in
their learning strategies, it follows that they ought not to
have the same education. By disregarding the very question
of whether there are provable gender differences in
learning, and presuming instead that no such differences
shall exist, the Supreme Court disserves the precepts of
both science and jurisprudence. As Rousseau surmised, and
as Darwin and his progeny have shown, women are
different from men in their learning strategies.
Nonetheless, the Court persists in presuming that

278. Id. at 171.
279. See id. at 190.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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educational programs that recognize, and differentiate for,
proven gender differences in learning violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The government programs presumed by
the Court to be constitutional are those that often deny to
women meaningful educational opportunities precisely
because they fail to recognize that all peafowl are not alike.
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